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In The SUPREME COURT 
Of The STATE Of UTAH 
H,1 THE MATTER OF THE 
!,:STATE OF DALLAS BED-
HHlD LEWIS, ALSO KNOWN 
AS U. H. LEWIS, DECEASED. 
Case No. 
LUCILLE PARKER, JACK HEIDT 
a id HOBERT GASTON, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
ERNEST L. LEWIS, 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
INTRODUCTORY 
10719 
A pµellants herein have appealed the Order of the Dis-
1.i-ict Court of Millard County appointing respondent as 
Aclm!!iistrator with Will Annexed in ancillary adminstra-
t1oi1 proceedings of the estate of Dallas Bedford Lewis. 
kespondent hereby defends his appointment and seeks to 
lu' 1: l he Order of the lower Court affirmed. 
THE RECORD 
For convenience and simplicity, the same classifica-
tiuns ::1rnl designations as used in Appellants' Brief will be 
u,,,~,1 herP in referring to the record on appeal: (a) The 
P!eadinµs file, pages numbered 1 through 11, and 98 
t lire ugh l 11. with Exhibits 1, 3 and 4 atta:·hed, here desig-
:1:\ted :1s "H."; (b) The so-called Original File, which is 
the l''i!J\" of the will and probate thereof authenticated by 
the C'alilrn nic:i Court, pages numbered 12 thrcugh 97, here 
1 10c.;i~~naft.·d as '"Of."; and ( c) The Reporter's Transcript, 
P<l'!Ps numbered 1 through 130, here designated as "Tr." 
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ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
In most respects, the Statement of Facts contained in 
Appellants' Brief is fairly accurate; however, respondent's 
view of the facts differs from appellants' in some respects. 
Respondent disagrees with the statement on page 3 of Ap-
pellants' Brief that the will named the appellants to per-
form certain duties and enjoy certain powers in connection 
with the administration of the decedent's estate, but con-
tends that the will names the appellants as trustees whose 
duties and powers are to commence after the administra-
tion, strictly speaking, of decedent's estate has been com-
pleted. (Of. 33) 
To the second paragraph on page 5 of Appellants' 
Brief should be added the information that the testator and 
his attorney, during the life-time of the testator, both 
knew and approved of Ernest L. Lewis re~eiving a pay-
ment of $24,000.00 from the Neales in connection with 
the exercise of the option mentioned. It should also be not-
ed that the transaction was arranged at the instigation of 
the testator and was complete except for formalities be-
fore his death. (Tr. 107-8, 111-12) 
In the following paragraph, the statement is made 
several times that the Food Company funds have been used 
in connection with the Sulphurdale properties. This state-
ment is inaccurate. D. B. Lewis invested his personal 
funds into the Sulphurdale venture. The personal funds 
may have been his income from the Food Company but 
were nevertheless his personal funds. The executors in 
California. after they were appointed, determined to lend 
monies from the Food Company to pay expenses in con-
nection with the venture, such monies to be repaid by the 
D. B. Lewis Estate. (Tr. 32) It is also to be noted that 
the expense allowance of Ernest L. Lewis from Lewis Food 
Company is made in connection with services rendered as 
Utah sales manager for the Fcod Company itself. (Tr. 53) 
The Appellants' Brief states on page 6 that the "only" 
nit:·ans of paying the cost of maintaining the joint venture 
property is with monies from the Food Company. This is 
an 1111 warranted conclusion. There are many potential 
~'uurces of funds to pay such costs, but the Food Company 
j,; probably the most convenient source; hence it has been 
'.'cle(te<l. (Tr. 121) 
In the final paragraph on page 6 of Appellants' Brief 
it is stated that the petitioner (Ernest L. Lewis) did not 
present with his petition a copy of the will and the pro-
uate thereof duly authenticated as "required" by the pro-
visions of Section 75-3-23, U.C.A. 1953. This statement is 
based on the false premise that the provisions of the code 
make such a requirement. Perusal of the Code Section re-
f erred to reveals that the language is permissive, net man-
datory. 
Significant facts omitted from Appellants' StatEment 
arc that Ernest L. Lewis was induced by D. B. Lewis to 
leave a profitable automobile business in Texas and come 
to lltah to take charge of the Sulphurdale property and 
had managed the testator's property in Utah since it was 
first acquired, a period of about five years. (Tr. 78, 123) 
and that he was in California at the time the testator cliecl 
ancl for several weeks thereafter. He made numerous at-
tempts to talk with the persons who were appointed as exe-
cutors by the California Court about the property in Utah, 
Lut they were unavailable to him. They did not seek in-
formation from him about the property or as to what legal 
cnnnsel his brother had been using in Utah. (Tr. 29, 31, 
8G, 108) The appellants showed very little interest in the 
Ltah property until after Ernest L. Lewis informed them 
that he had filed a petition for ancillary administration in 
Utah. (Tr. 13) And even on the date hearing was held 
in Utah. July 6, 196G, little or nothing had been done about 
prulJate proceedings in the States of Idaho and Oregon 
\\'here the testator also had property interests. (Tr. 13) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
APPELLANTS WERE NOT NAMED AS EXECU-
TORS IN THE WILL OF DECEDENT. 
(a) The Order of The California Court Ap-
pointing Appellants as Executors Applies Only to 
the Portion of the Estate in California. 
Appellants cite considerable authority tending to show 
that the order of a Court admitting a will ito probate is 
binding on all persons having Notice of the proceeding 
and also must be given full faith and credit by other states. 
Utah has a statute to this effect. Respondent is in full 
agreement with the authorities cited. 
However, to attempt to use this line of argument and 
the authorities cited to show that the appointment of exe-
cutors of an estate in California is binding upon a Utah 
Court for ancillary aciministration of the estate in Utah 
is to display a surprising lack of understanding of the 
fundamental nature of administration proceedings. Ad-
ministration proceedings are in rem, not in personam. 
Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 Pac. 522; Bancroft, 
PYobate Practice, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 40. As proceedings 
in rem, they have effect on things, the things being the 
properties of an estate. And it is elementary that the 
Courts of any state have no jurisJiction over propErties 
beyond their boundaries. Bancroft, Prnbate Practice, 2nd 
Ed., Vol. 4, Sec. 1227. For this reason, ancillary adminis-
tration proceedings become necessary when a decedent 
owned property locatecl in more than one state. But the 
ancillary administration proceeding is not a part of the 
domiciliary administration. Bancroft, Probate Practice, 
2nd Ed., Vol. 4, Sec. 1222 states: 
5 
Ancillary administration is accordingly not to 
be regarded as subsidiary, but rather as an inde-
pendent administration, limited in effect to proper-
ty physically within the jurisdiction, and directed 
primarily to the protection of local creditors of the 
decedent. 
Ordinarily there is not even privity between an-
cillary and domestic representatives. 
This principle is elaborated in 21 American Juris-
prudence 848 et seq.: 
Although it has been said that an ancillary ad· 
ministrator is in some respects the deputy or agent 
of the domiciliary representative, it must be borne 
in mind that he receives his authority, not from the 
executor, but under a different law, that he admin-
isters the estate which comes to his hands under a 
different law from, and perhaps conflicting with 
the law of the domicile, and that he is not answer-
able for his conduct to the domiciliary representa-
tive ... (A) lthough a domiciliary and ancillary rep-
resentative are in privity with the decedent, there is 
no privity between themselves. . . It is an elemen-
tary principle that letters testimentary or of admin-
istration have no legal force or effect beyond the 
territorial limits of the state in which they are 
granted. . . ( S) ince an ancillary administrator de-
rives his authority from the laws of the state of his 
appointment, he is concerned with and has author-
ity to collect the debts, receive the assets situated in 
the state where the administration is granted. 
If the law were not as stated above, the sovereignty 
of the several states would be seriously infringed. Orders 
made by Courts of one state could have effects on property 
located in other states. But the law is that administrati011 
uf an estate in California is subject to the California 
Conrts ancl ac1ministration of an estate in Utah is exclus-
ively within the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts. The only 
limitation on the c<·mplete sovereignty of the Courts of th<! 
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va1·ious states in probate proceedings is that a will which 
has been found to be valid in the state where it was execu-
ted must be recognized as valid in other states. This prin-
ciple has been specifically enacted into law in this state in 
Section 75-3-24, U.C.A. 1953: 
75-3-24. Hearing and Proof. - If on the hear-
ing it appears on the face of the record that the 
will has been proved, allowed and admitted to pro-
bate in any other state or territory of the United 
States, or in any foreign country, and that it was 
executed according to the law of the place in which 
the same was made, or in which the testator was at 
the time domiciled, or in conformity with the laws 
of this state, it must be admitted to probate and 
shall have the same force and effect as a will first 
admitted to probate in this state, and letters testi-
mentary or of administration shall issue thereon. 
Beyond recognizing the probate of a will in another state 
or in a foreign country, the statute cited in no way indi-
cates that any reeognition is to be given to any furthei· 
orders of the foreign Court with respect to the administra-
tion of the estate. 
Respondent does not here collaterally attack the Or-
der of the California Court. He is concerned only with 
the administration pro~eeding in Utah. This is a separate 
proceeding under jurisdiction of the Courts of a different 
sovereign state. The order of the lower Court in this 'State 
did not in effect strike down the order of the California 
Court. It had no effect on it. The executors appointed in 
California are still executors in California. But the lower 
Court in Utah properly determined that the administra-
tion of the portion of the estate located in Utah was with-
in its jurisdiction and has proceeded accordingly. 
(b) Utah Courts Must Determine Who Is Entitled to 
Administer an Estate in Utah. 
Appellants cite several sections of the Utah Code to 
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:-il:mv that 1.hP property of this estate should be deemed as 
personal pruperty and therefore is controlled by the law of 
the domicile. Respondent does not disagree. But appel-
lants' argument is not material to this case. In the first 
place, the matter now before the Court is not a determina-
tion about the disposition of property, real or personal, bu~ 
a determination as to the selection of a personal represen-
tative of the estate. The law pertaining to a determination 
of this sort is succinctly stated in 33 Corpus Juris Secun-
dum 923, Sec. 31: 
The law of the place where the estate is to be 
administered, and not the law of the domocile of the 
decedent, governs in who is entitled to administer. 
Even if the argument of appellants were material, the 
law of the domiciliary state is presumed to be the same as 
the law of this state unless proven otherwise. Jn re Camp-
bell's Estate, 53 Utah 487, 173 Pac. 688. And no proof 
has been made that the law in California differs in any re-
sped from the law in Utah. Moreover, this Court has al·· 
ready been confronted with the type of argument now pro-
pounded by appellants, in the case of In Re Campbell's Es-
to tc, s11p1 o, and its ruling ought to settle the issue: 
The contention that the Courts of this state are 
precluded from construing the will because the 
Courts of California, where the domiciliary admin-
istration is had, may place a construction thereon 
different than given it by the Courts of this state, 
is whollv without merit. No authorities are cited, 
nor do we think any can be found, that support 
counsel's contention in that regard. 
The general rule, as declared by practically all 
of the authorities on the subject, is that the law 
of the testator's domicile governs the construction 
of his will disposing of personalty, and that Courts 
exercising ancillary powers should be governed .by 
th is rule in construing wills, unless a construct10n 
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of the law of the testator's domicile contravenes the 
law of the state where the will is offered for pro-
bate . . . Furthermore, we have a statute declara-
tory of this general rule which is as follows: 
(The Court cites the Section which is now Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, 74-3-21.) 
It will be noticed that this section in plain and 
unmistakable terms provides that the "interpreta-
tion" of wills shall be governed, when relating to 
personal property, by the law of testator's domicile, 
and not, as counsel's argument seems to imply, by 
the interpretation given wills by the Courts of a 
sister state where the domiciliary administration is 
had. 
While the interpretation of a will under these 
circumstances by the Courts of some other state 
should, and would, be given much weight by the 
Courts of this state, such interpretation neverthe-
less would not be binding. 
After making the above statement of law, this Court 
proceeded to determine a matter involving personal pro-
perty of an estate in which there was an ancillary admin-
istration in Utah and a domiciliary admin~stration in 
California in direct contravention of a ruling already made 
by a California Court - - giving considertion to the law of 
California, but refusing to be bound by the decision of the 
California Court. Surely appellants' contention that the 
Utah Court in this case is bound by the Order of the Cali-
fornia Court in the proceeding held there is not to be 
taken seriously. 
(c) The Will Names No Executors. 
Though it is preferable both for the protection of the 
citizens of a state where ancillary administration is had 
and fer the benefit o.f the estate that a resident of the state 
of ancillary arlministration be appointed to administer the 
-
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estate, appellants correctly contend that where persons are 
named in a will as executors, their non-residence does not 
disqualify them for appointment in the State of Utah. On 
the other hand, if they are not named in the will as execu-
tors, their appointment is expressly prohibited by Section 
75-4-4, U.C.A. 1953: 
No person is competent or entitled to serve a8 
administrator or administratrix who is either: 
( 2) Not a bona fide resident of the state .... 
The foregoing section of the Utah Code should be ap-
plied in the light of: First, what will best serve and pro-
tect the citizens of Utah? and, second, what is best for the 
estate? It is the Utah Court's duty to determine whether 
or not the will named executors, and if there is a doubt, 
the doubt should be resolved in favor of having a personal 
representative on the spot in Utah, available to demands 
of creditors and persons having an interest in or claim 
upon the property which is situated in this state. This doc-
trine is set forth in 33 Corpus Juris Se~ undum 906, Sec. 22, 
as followR: 
(I) t may be stated generally that the appointment 
of executors by construction or implication from the 
terms of the will should not be favored, but ir. 
doubtful cases administration with will annexed 
should be resorted to. 
The will of this decedent names no executors. It 
names certain persons as "trustees", but it is not proper 
to inf er from the will that the testator intended these per-
sons to be executors. It was held in Estate of Clary, 98 
Cal. 2d 521!, 220 Pac. 2d 754 that: 
Unless the Court can conclude from the words of 
the testator that the latter intended for his devisee 
to take charge of the estate, collect his assets, pay 
his debts, and perform the usual functions of an 
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executor, it is error to appoint such devisee. 
A good deal of stretching and reading between the lines 
is necessary to conclude from this decedent's will that the 
appellants herein were intended to perform the functions 
of executors. Rather, the testator was obviously doing 
some relatively long range planning. Ineptly, but never-
theless quite certainly, the testator manifests his desire 
that his property be distributed to trustees of numerous 
trusts, charging the trustees to use the properties and 
monies placed in their custody to carry out various terms 
and wishes which were dictated into the will. Appellants 
have in their Brief quoted a paragraph from page 14 of 
the will in which trustees are named. It is appropriate 
that the succeeding two paragraphs of the will also be 
quoted and called to the attention of the Court: 
Throughout this will I have instructed tha'. 
Security First National Bank be used as Co-Trui,;-
tee; however, my Trustees shall have the right t0 
change banks to any other responsible bank as Co-
Trustee should they for any reason feel that th.c 
Security First National Bank is not satisfa torr 
due to too high fees or any other reasons, with C'l' 
without cause. The head of the Trustees shall be 
Lucille Casso-Parker and the Trusteeship shall oper-
ate on a majority rule until such time as John Ray-
mond Lewis, as specified heretofore, becomes of age 
and shall become chairman of the Trustees, and 
when he reaches age thirty the Trusteeship shall be 
disbanded and he shall become the sole authority 
with the above instructions in effect. 
During the existence of this Trusteeship, the 
Trustees involved shall be paid a reasonable com-
pensation for their efforts and ti.me devoted to the 
execution and carrying out to the best of their abil-
ity the wishes that have been dictated into this will. 
(Of. 33) 
It is to be noted that Lucille Parker is apparentl:v to 
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Lw replaced as a trustee by John Raymond Lewis, who is 
presently a young boy of about twelve years of age, when 
he Lecomes of age and that the trusteeship is to endure un-
til he reaches the age of thirty years. The testator does 
tl!!t appear to be talking about the winding up of his af-
f<Jirn and the settlement and distribution of his estate, but 
rather about the carrying on of his business and using the 
earnings to carry out certain wishes which he expressed 
in the will. It is not likely that the testator intended his 
estate to remain in administration for a period of eighteen 
years. 
Appellants cite several sections of the Utah Code per-
taining to interpretation of wills. An additional section 
which is even more pertinent to this matter is Section 
74-2-5, U.C.A. 1953: 
7 4-2-5. All Parts To Be Harmonized, If Possible. 
All the parts of a will are to be construed in relation 
to each other, and, if possible, so as to form one con-
sistent whole; but where several parts are absolute-
ly irreconcilable, the latter must prevail. 
Tht> paragraphs from the will quoted above are the 
last paragraphs in the will in which the words trustee and 
trusteeship are used. It is very clear in these paragraphs 
that the testator was speaking of a trusteeship and not of 
the administration of his estate. If earlier references to 
trnstees in the will are inconsistent with the references in 
these paragraphs, the references in these paragraphs 
should prevail. 
Since, to say the least, there is great doubt that the 
lestator intended to appoint the appellants herein as the 
executors of his Last Will and Testament, the finding ancl 
conclusion of the lower Court that no executors were 
nmnecl in the will is proper. 
12 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT HAD THE RIGHT TO USE 
ITS DISCRETION IN THE APPOINTMENT OF' 
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTA TE Il\ 
UTAH. 
(a) Appellants Failed to File Their Petition for 
Letters Testamentarv Within the Time Limit 
Allowed by Utah Law. 
Even if the appellants had been named as executors 
in the will, a Utah Court is not obligated to appoint them 
to administer the portion of this estate located in Utah. 
Section 75-3-4, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
If the person named in a will as executor, for thirty 
days after he has knowledge of the death of the tes-
tator and that he is named as executor, fails to pe-
tion for the probate of the will and for letters tes-
timentary, he may be held to have renounced his 
rights to letters, and the Court may appoint any 
other competent person administrator, unless good 
cause for the delay is shown. 
This Section of the Code has been applied in the cas(~ 
of In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342, 353, 285 Pac 299: 
It may be conceded that, where the petition by the 
party named as executor is filed in time, the Court 
has no discretion but to appoint the party named 
executor unless he is disqualified by statute, but 
this Court has already committed itself to the doc-
trine that failure to make timely application for let-
ters testimentary leaves it in the discretion of the 
Court whether he appoints the person having the 
preferential right or some other competent person. 
Appellants contend that the holding of In re Love's 
Estate, supra, is not pertinent in the case of an ancillan· 
administration. But it is submitted that appellants con-
tention is incorrect. Ban~roft, Probate Pract?'ce, 2nd Ed., 
Vol. 4, Sec. 1228, states: 
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Hut statutes declaring that one named as execu-
tor renounces his preference right to letters if he 
fails to apply therefor within a specified number of 
days after he has knowledge of the death of the tes-
tator and that he is named as executor, apply in an-
cillary as well as domiciliary administration. 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming in holding that a sec-
tion of the Wyoming law similar to the section of Uta:1 
lcnr cited applies to a foreign as well as a domestic will and 
that preference is lost by delay, commented that the ob-
jed of the statute is to secure prompt settlement of es-
tates. That Court held that after expiration of the thirty 
day period, who is to be appointed to administer the es-
t ·~c~ l;e:::c mes a matter for the sound discretion of the 
Court. Rice v. Tilton, 80 Pac. 828. The purpose of the 
thi1·tv day 11 mitation is, of course, for the protection of the 
estate and the persons having claims against or rights un-
der the estate. These persons ought not to be required to 
:-;ubmit to la:k of diligence on the part of the persons 
named in the will. 
(b) Appellants Failed to Show Good Cause For 
Their Delay in Filing Probate Proceedings in 
Utah. 
Whether or not good cause for the de:ay in filing pro-
bate prneeeclings in Utah was shown is s:.1bstantially a mat-
ter of fad to he dete1mined by the lower Court -- the lower 
Ccurt having the advantage of seeing the witnesses and 
hearing them testify and observing their demeanor, all of 
whkh must be considered along with the statements which 
h~Lome part of the re_ord. The finding; of the lower Court 
is as follows: 
1 :1. This Court finds that they did not show 
good cause, or in fact any cause for such delay, 
other than that they didn't feel that it was import-
ant as compared with other matters, and that they 
\\ere net ci: neerned until after they were informed 
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of the petition by Ernest L. Lewis. There was no 
showing that they were in any way prevented from 
petitioning this Court, and in fact there was testi-
mony that Mr. Ernest L. Lewis informed one or 
more of them of the urgency for action in Utah, and 
that they ignored such statements and appeared to 
avoid contact with Mr. Lewis. (R. 102) 
The appellants contention that the Utah petition 
could not be filed until the will was admitted to probate 
in California is erroneous. There is no requirement fJ~· 
Utah law that a will must be proved in the domiciliary 
state before it can be submitted for probate in Utah. Nor 
is there any requirement that the probate proceedings in 
the domi _iliary state and a wpy of the will must be sub-
mitted at the time a petition is filed in Utah. As has been 
previously noted, the language of the Utah statutes is per-
missive, and not mandatory. Conceding, though, bat 
there may be justification for waiting until the will has 
been admitted in the domiciliary state before filing pro-
bate proceedings in another state, the facts remain foat 
the appellants did not in any way commen,e to make pn;-
parations for filing in Utah or even to inquire about Utah 
law qr Utah counsel until after Ernest L. Lewis informed 
them l:e had filed his petition. At that time they immedi-
ately became very interested in the property in Utah, but 
still did nothing about the property in the States of Idaho 
and Oregon, and probate in these states was still in abey-
ance on July 6, 1966, the date on which the hearing on this 
matter was held in Utah. (Tr. 13) It is a proper infer-
ence that the appellants were spurred to action in Utah 
solely by the act:on of the respondent. Prior to that time. 
they had not consulted with him about the property ur 
about what legal counsel his brother had used in Utah and 
appeared to be avoiding him, though he made attempts to 
be aYallable to them and to inform them of matters per-
taining- to t~1e Utah prcpf'rty. (Tr. 86, 103) 
1G 
(f'.) The Utah Court Properly Exercised Its Sound 
Discretion in Appointing a Personal Represen-
tative of the Estate in Utah. 
Respondent is in full accord with the contentions of 
appellants that the affairs of Lewis Food Company and the 
e"tate in California are of extreme importance and requil e 
diligent care. They must not be neglected. These affairs 
are a heavy responsibility for the appellants. Lucille Par-
ker. a mother of four young children, has had to assume 
the great responsibility of the presidency of Lewis Food 
C:(Jmpany. (Tr. 49) Jack Heidt, a vice president of a bank, 
i" haYing- to hear burdens in connection with this estate in 
:1 !ditirm to his full time regu~ar emp:oyment. ( Tr. 24) And 
Rf1bert Gaston, an attorney who is subject to the demands 
of a substantial law practice, also has to assume the ad-
ditional demands of the D. B. Lewis estate. (Tr. 75) 
With the burdens and responsibilities placed upon 
them in California, the appellants are undoubtedly more 
tlian busy. In addition to thiR, to take on the responsibility 
of a substantial property in Utah is beyond their compe-
tence. They were unable even to initiate inquiry about the 
rrquirements of Utah law before an important statutor:v 
dea'.lline had e}pir2d. At least one of the appellants w;;;s 
still nn;nvare that anyone was in charge of the Utah pro-
perty as late as July 6, 1966. (Tr. 29) 
Appf'llants make attempts to cast doubts upon the 
ability of Ernest L. Lewis to administer the property by 
<~sserting that at his instigation the Food Company im· 
mediately following the death of decedent was induced tu 
uay out $415,000.00 in purchase of the Neales' interest in 
the Utah property. This was not done at the instigation 
of Ernest L. Lewis, but at the instigation of D. B. Lewis 
prior to his death. Ernest L. Lewis and Mr. Murchison. 
Tl B. Lewis' attorney, were merely concerned about carry-
ing cut the \Vish of the decedent to settle a lawsuit in whish 
1 :1r decedent was being sued for $35,000,000.00. (Tr. 107 -
10) Until that lawsuit was settled, the whole estate, in-
cluding Lewis Food Company, was in jeopardy. For thi:,; 
reason, n. B. Lewis had five days prior to his death, sum-
moned his brother, Ernest L. Lewis, to California to ar-
range for purchase of the Neales' interest in Sulphurdak 
and thereby settle the lawsuit. The option was obtained 
by Ernest L. Lewis on a Friday and D. B. Lewis died the 
following Monday night. Ernest L. Lewis spent a larvr~ 
part of that Monday with his brother and his brother's at-
torney going over the papers, making copies of them, and 
arranging for the transaction. (Tr. 108) 
A further innuendo against Ernest L. Lewis in Ap-
pellanh;' Brief is the mention that nothing was left to him 
directly under the will - - that a trust was created for 
Ernest L Lev»is, his wife and his son but no responsibilit:. 
whatever was placed in the hands of Ernest in connection 
with the administration of the estate. In this conne tion, 
it is significant that the testator died at the relative·y 
young age of sixty-two years and that though Ernest L. 
Lewis is a few years younger, he was experiencing a per-
iod of serious illness during the time when the testator 
\ms writing- his will. (Tr. 122) Furthermore, everyone is 
av:are of the inheritance tax advantages in skipping gener-
ations in disposing of propertits in wills. For these reas-
ons, not lack of conf iden; e in Ernest L. Lewis, the deced-
ent made his provision for Ernest L. Lewis and his other 
brothers and sisters in the form of trusts for their de-
cendents. The facts that the decedent placed Ernest L. 
Lewis in charge of his property in Utah during his life-
time and entrusted him to negotiate settlement of a $35,-
000,000.00 lawsuit show that he did repose confidence in 
him. (Tr. 107-10) The lower Court vvas fully justified ir. 
finding- that Ernest L. Lewis was competent in every way 
and nniquel.v qtrnlifit>'l to a<'minister the property of the 
estatp in Utah. 
Appellants urge that a unified administration of an 
t•state of this size and complexity is preferable. But this 
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Llils to take into consideration the most important reason 
\\by an ancillary proceeding is required. The primary pur-
p11se of an ancillary proceeding is to protect the citizens 
and all persons who may have an interest in or claim 
against the property in the state where the ancillary ad-
ministration is had. It is obvious that this purpose can 
best be accomplished by having a personal representative 
present and residing in the state of ancillary administra-
tion. Moreover, the size and complexity of this estate 
make it desirable that a local administrator be appointed 
in addition to the domiciliary representatives. Appellants 
are "spread too thin" to take the necessary interest in and 
c:are of the Utah property. The lower Court was convinced 
r,f this when it found: 
All three of them displayed no particular interest 
or concern in or for the Utah properties of this de-
cedent, and none of them had much if any know-
ledge of the properties. It appeared to this Court 
that their only interest in the Utah properties an,c>e~ 
after Ernest L. Lewis filed his petition herein, and 
was to the effect that he should be precluded from 
being so appointed. (R. 102) 
Upon determining that the appointment of a personal 
reprn:;entative of the estate was a matter within its dis-
cretion, the lower Court no doubt weighed the various fac-
tors just mentioned. Furthermore, the contestants had all 
appeared in Court and testified and their appearance and 
demeanor may have influenced the weight of their testi-
mony. The efforts of Ernest L. Lewis in preserving the 
Pstate b~· seeing that a $35,000,000.00 lawsuit was settled 
acc 1Jn\ing to his hrother's vvishes, in taking action to sell 
pr(Jperty \vhich the will dire:ted to be sold, (Tr. 87) anr.i 
in 1aki1w steps to see that scmeone was appointed to act .. 
minister the estate in Utah and to have authority to con-
1·ey the propertr if a sale should materialize, together with 
l1i-; knowledge of and proximity to the property (Tr. 78) 
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were no doubt compared with the efforts and knowledge 
and availability of the appellants. Though he lives and 
works only a few miles from the headquarters of Lewis 
Food Company, Jack Heidt did not get around to making 
a visit there from the date of D. B. Lewis' death (April 
25, 1966) until June 6, 1966 (Tr. 24) and he displayed no 
knowledge or understanding whatever about Sulphurdale. 
(Tr. 27) Robert Gaston had managed to visit the Lewi& 
Food Company headquarters twice in the two and a half 
month period from the date of the testator's death till the 
hearing in Utah. (Tr. 75) It appears from the record that 
the general management of Lewis Food Company has been 
left almost entirely in the hands of a young housewife 
who had previously been working only a part of one day a 
week. (Tr. 48) The lower Court did not err in exercising 
its sound discretion to appoint Ernest L. Lewis to adminis-
ter the estate in Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The order and findings of the lower Court are justi-
fied by the facts and law. Its Order denying the petition 
of appellants and allowing the petition of respondent and 
appointing respondent as administrator with will annexed 
for the conduct of ancillary administration proceedings 
in this jurisdiction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. LEE PETERSEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
j 
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